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Owners Beware: Themes and Variations in 
Property Law
DOROTHEA WAY AND*
Within the last twenty years a series of rulings in various 
Commonwealth countries has had the effect o f limiting the once 
supreme right of ownership. The Canadian Veinot case was the 
most recent. The present study attempts to place this case against 
the background of Roman property law. A historical analysis o f the 
evolution of the Roman law reveals a concept that has not been as 
stable as one would think. We fin d  that ownership as we would define 
it today has not always existed. Instead, there was an early form that 
can hardly be distinguished from possession, followed by various other 
forms. Our present concept can, therefore, be seen not as an 
immutable institution but as another such variation upon a theme. 
Moreover, we may be at the threshold of a new form.
Private property derives from Roman intellect and Germanic sentiment.
(Karl Marx, Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts).
Introduction
“Trespassers beware!” may well turn into “Owners beware!” At 
least to judge from the case of the injured snowmobiler,1 an Ontario 
case which was decided by the Supreme Court o f Canada in 1974.
A snowmobiler lost his way one night. Without realising it he 
drove onto a private road. This road belonged to a company and led 
to their powder magazine. To stop vehicles going as far as the magazine 
they had placed an overhead pipe across the road. It was unmarked 
and the snowmobiler crashed into it, suffering injuries. He sued the 
company for negligence.
The snowmobiler was a trespasser, however. The common law says 
trespassers must take land as they find it. An owner is not bound 
to warn a trespasser o f hidden dangers on the land. He doesn’t owe 
a duty o f care.
♦Law degree (Referendar), 1946 (Vienna), Dr. Jur., 1947 (Vienna). Associate Professor, Faculty of  
Law, Carleton University.
1Vemot v. Kmr-Adduon Mmts Ltd. [1975] 2 S.C.R. 311.
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This was the view of English common law. Victorian England 
insisted that an Englishman’s home was his castle: an owner’s rights 
over his land were absolute — so far at least as regards trespassers. 
Lord Hailsham stated the principle as follows: “Towards the trespasser 
the occupier has no duty to take reasonable care for his protection or 
even to protect him from concealed danger. The trespasser comes on to 
the premises at his own risk. An occupier is in such a case liable only 
where the injury is due to some wilful act involving something more than 
the absence of reasonable care.”2 As late as 1964 an English court3 
reaffirmed this view. Yet in Canada by 1974 an altogether different 
principle had developed.
In the case of the trespassing snowmobiler the Supreme Court of 
Canada found the defendant company liable for negligence. An owner 
does owe a duty o f care, the court said, to trespassers. The defendants 
broke this duty o f care by leaving the pipe-gate in its original position 
and not marking it.
Is this ruling such a break with tradition? There have already been 
movements towards restriction of property rights. In England itself 
there was the Occupiers Liability Act, 1957. In the Commonwealth 
the courts have showed signs of a new approach. Beginning with 
Commissioner fo r  railways (N .S.W .) v. Cardy,4 in 1960, more clearly expressed 
in Herrington v. British Railways Board* and lately in Southern Portland 
Cement Ltd. v. Cooper,6 the position of the trespasser has been newly 
defined. As a result, the owner has come to bear increased duties of 
care. His rights have been restricted.
They have also been restricted in Ontario and other Canadian 
provinces. Numerous pieces of Ontario legislation have encroached on 
land owners’ rights. The Municipal Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 284, The Planning 
Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 349, The Registry Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 409, The Land 
Titles Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 234, The Landlord and Tenant Act, R.S.O. 1969,
c. 236, The Expropriations Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 154 and a multitude of 
other acts inhibit the owner in the full and exclusive use of his property.
It appears then that the law of ownership is less settled than we 
thought. Unsettled law, though, is itself unsettling. We ask, how can 
rooted principles become questionable? How can the firmly rooted 
concept o f ownership be questioned? Is it perhaps that the concept never 
was firmly rooted? Indeed, how was the concept of ownership defined?
*In Robert Addte & Sons (Collieries) v. Dumbreck, [1929] A.C. 358 at 365.
*In Commissioner for Railways v. Qumlan, [1964] A.C. 1054.
*(1960-61) 104 C.L.R. 274.
»[1972] A.C. 877.
•[1974] 1 All E.R. 87.
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Defining ownership confronts us with the problem: how “absolute” 
should it be? Should property be an all-encompassing, overriding, 
absolute concept? O r should it be a right limited by the rights of other 
individuals and of the community as a whole?
This question turns upon another question. Do we want a society 
devoted to principles of efficiency or one guided by principles of 
justice? Efficiency o f production and distribution of goods encourages 
an absolute, untrammelled individual right to property, for this will lead 
the owner to use it more effectively to produce goods for himself and, 
indirectly, for society. Justice would urge a limited right of property, 
restricted by neighbours’ rights and by society’s needs.
O ur constitutions show which we prefer — efficiency or justice. 
Property, though a legal concept, like all such concepts, is set into a 
political and economic framework. Thus we may have a constitution 
that favours the individual and his rights, or one of socialist inclination, 
or a compromise between the two. The standpoint taken by a constitu­
tion will, in turn, often reflect the needs of a society at a given period.
Absolute Ownership
Absolute ownership has a distinguished history. We first meet it 
as the culmination of a long evolution in Roman law. Then it reappears 
in the Renaissance with the Commentators, continues into the Enlighten­
ment, and flowers during the Industrial Revolution. This is the indi­
vidualistic notion o f man as the owner of things, having every right to 
them: the idea o f ownership as the unlimited and unrestricted title to a 
thing.
It was from England that one of the strongest reinforcements of 
the sanctity of private property came. This was John Locke’s inclusion 
o f property rights among the innate natural rights of man, the protection 
o f which is the content of the social contract.7
His sentiment took hold particularly in England and in North 
America, where it became a theoretical basis for the Industrial Revolu­
tion. At the same time continental European thought arrived at similar 
conclusions via the classical Roman law tradition which had somehow 
persisted through the centuries, and which received a strong new 
impetus after the beginning of the 19th century, particularly in the school 
of the German Pandectists.
Thus, during the early decades of the 19th century the second apex 
of the extreme individualistic notion o f ownership as an absolute right 
was reached. This apex occurred at the meeting of the theories o f the
’John Locke. Two Treatises of Civil Government (London: Everyman’s Library, 1962), at 129.
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German Pandectists with the simultaneous flowering o f the “laissez- 
faire” economy with its hero the entrepreneur, the owner o f the capital 
and other means of production and the taker of risks.8 It was quite 
obvious that he alone should have full control over his property: 
investment, product and gain. The three modern codes designed during 
the 19th century all reflect this attitude to some extent — since modified 
by an increasing social conscience. The definition of property according 
to Art. 544 of the Code Napoléon is: “La propriété est le droit de 
jouir et disposer des choses de manière la plus absolue, pourvu qu’on 
n’en fasse pas un usage prohibé par les lois ou par les règlements.” 
Art. 354 of the Austrian civil code, ABGB, defines property thus: 
“Seen as a right, property is the liberty of using a thing at will, in 
substance as well as its accrued fruits, and to exclude everybody else 
from it.”9 Art. 362 adds the rights of the owner: “Following from his 
right of disposition over this property the absolute owner normally 
may use or not use a thing; he may destroy it, transfer it fully or 
partially or he may give it up.”10 The German Code, BGB, describes 
property indirectly in Art. 903 by defining the rights of the owner: 
“The owner of a thing may, as far as the law or the rights of others 
are not violated, deal with his property as he wishes and he may 
exclude others from interference.”11
Less than Absolute Ownership
T here have been other periods in history, however, when ownership 
was less clear, less encompassing. The Middle Ages moved away from 
the Roman idea of absolute ownership. As feudalism developed, there 
was no longer property in the Roman sense, at least as far as land was 
concerned, but a rather hazy notion of land-hold, closer to possession 
than to ownership.12 This view of landed property lasted particularly 
long in England and influenced common-law thinking.
After a brief period of extreme individualism and absolute property 
rights, a reverse movement set in later in the 19th century, both on the 
Continent and in England. An indication of this shift may be seen in the 
German Civil Code, passed in 1900, which is almost 100 years younger
*F.C. v. Savigny, Das Recht des Besitzes (Wien: C. Gerold’s Sohn, 1865).
'"Als ein Recht betrachtet, ist Eigentum das Befugnis, mit der Substanz und den Nutzungen einer 
Sache nach Willkür zu schalten, und jeden ändern davon auszuschlie^en."
'•“Kraft des Rechtes, frei über sein Eigentum zu verfügen, kann der vollständige Eigentümer in der 
Regel seine Sache nach Willkür benützen oder unbenützt lassen; er kann sie vertilgen, ganz oder 
zum Teile auf Andere übertragen, oder unbedingt sich derselben begeben, das ist, sie verlassen."
" “Der Eigentümer einer Sache kann, soweit nicht das Gesetz oder Rechte Dritter entgegenstehen, 
mit der Sache nach Belieben verfahren und andere von jeder Einwirkung ausschlie^en."
"F.W. Maitland, The Forms of Action at Common Law (Cambridge: University Press, 1968), 
at 43; P. Vinogradoff, Roman Law in Medieval Europe (Cambridge: Speculum Historiale, 1968), at 88.
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than the French and Austrian codes. Following Art. 903 (quoted above) 
the German Code contains several articles which show greater consideration 
for the rights o f others than the two older codes in their original 
versions.13 This reflects a general trend during the latter part of the 
19th century away from the notion of property as an unlimited absolute 
right. Restrictions were of two kinds: those which originated in public 
law and those based upon private law. In both cases increased con­
sideration was given to society, and less to the individual.
Restraints through the private law consisted in respect for neighbours’ 
rights. In England such theories had existed from early on concerning 
straying farm animals. The formulation of these theories by Blackburn, J. 
and their extension to other kinds of damage caused by a property 
owner made Rylands v. Fletcher, 14 1868, an early landmark in the withdrawal 
from a strictly individualistic attitude of “laissez-faire” economics and 
the corresponding sanctity of individual property. Similar restraints were, 
and are, enforced by civilist legal systems, whLh also enforce pro­
hibitions against malicious or spiteful use o f property rights. U nder the 
influence of socialist movements a great deal moro consideration is now 
given to the economically or socially weaker members of the population. 
This sentiment is reflected in laws to protect the workman, the 
tenant, the installment buyer. In France postwar legislation to protect 
the tenant farm er constitutes a serious infringement of the owner’s 
right to contract with a new tenant after expiry of a lease.15 The 
Agricultural Holding Act of 1948 has also improved the position of the 
tenant farm er in England.
Public law restraints are becoming even more ubiquitous. There 
are now numerous restraints dictated by public law which serve the 
public good and often are of a preventive nature: expropriation laws, 
antipollution measures, building guidelines and many others. While 
restrictions which protect and encourage neighbourliness have probably 
always been basically the same, those in favour of social utility are 
constantly added to.
But these restrictions on ownership are not simply due to justice 
being preferred to efficiency. In fact, the old distinction between justice 
and efficiency may not hold any longer. Efficiency may no longer 
allow absolute ownership. The public law restrictions of a preventive 
nature are working, not only towards justice, but also towards greater 
efficiency o f the use of the environment and o f resources. Reflecting
'*Art. 904 demands toleration of trespass to land or chattel if necessary to prevent incomparably 
greater damage to others (— with compensation); Art 905. Although the code establishes rights above 
and below the surface o f the owned land, it provides legal protection only if actual material interest 
of the owner is involved; Art. 906. An action in nuisance is only acceptable if the enjoyment o f land 
is gravely disturbed through excessive and severe effluence from adjoining property.
‘«[1868] L.R. 3 H.L. 330.
,5W. Friedmann, Law in a Changing Society (London; Stevens, 1959), at 83.
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on both absolute ownership and restricted ownership one comes to 
realise their impermanence and the need for occasional change. This 
indicates the value of taking a look at the Roman law of ownership. 
Not only was Roman law a great legal system but one fundamental to 
many modern legal concepts. The law went through a long evolution 
which enables us to follow the development of a legal concept like 
ownership and to draw upon the advantage of past experiences.
Roman Law
A look at early Roman history and prehistory through documen­
tation, and failing this, through extrapolation and conjecture, shows that 
ownership was a gradually evolving concept. In fact it shows the opposite 
development to that of our own law — both developments having been 
caused by socio-economic circumstances. The development of the Roman 
concept began with a primitive, archaic law which did not distinguish 
between possession and ownership, and continued until preclassical 
and classical law with increasing refinements and, after the third century 
A.D., with increasing vulgarisation and simplification.
Sketching Roman law’s slow process from primitive, prehistoric 
property concepts to the sophisticated view of absolute ownership, we 
meet various intermediary forms and stages of great historical interest. 
These may suggest some compromise solutions for ourselves, since for 
us full property rights may soon no longer be feasible and retreat 
from almost absolute individual ownership rights may prove necessary. 
Today there may be more than purely legal relevance in studying 
periods which knew no private property at all or else knew only limited 
property rights. Today therefore we need to take a second look at the 
well-established notion o f an individual’s property rights, at ancient forms 
of property in general, and at land occupation in particular.
Prehistoric Development
Anthropological studies show that most primitive societies evolve 
according to a parallel pattern. At first primitive man is a nomadic 
hunter. As such he has no theoretical notion o f property but relies 
on actual possession and use derived from peaceful or forceful acquisition. 
Personal items, like weapons, tools, clothing and slaves, have been “held” 
by individuals from time immemorial. The personal property-like relation­
ship probably derives from the form of acquisition: such items were either 
produced by the individual for his own use or acquired by conquest. 
Later, such economic factors as scarcity of grazing land, denser population, 
difficulty of moving about, as well as some degree o f civilisation pro­
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duced the animal breeding stage. At first, it seems the flocks were held 
communally, though they became the quasi-property of individuals or 
families. Ultimately, the need for more food resulted in the tilling of 
land and growing of crops.16
These different types of land use affected the form of ownership 
of land. To herdsm en land is useful if commonly held by tribe or clan, 
to farmers it is more useful if divided and apportioned to those families 
who have been working it. Another notable social tendency is that of 
extending the concept of private property to include things used in the 
production of wealth, a tendency which will dismay Marxist theorists.
Roman Social Development
We may visualize the very early Romans then as a primitive people 
in the process o f ascending from a cattle breeding society to an agricultural 
one. Cultivation of land was still in its infancy and barely yielded a 
subsistence. It was therefore supplem ented with the returns from animal 
husbandry, the only source of surplus. In consequence, the wealthy 
class was constituted of cattle breeders who alone could amass some 
wealth using hum an and animal labour.
We now think o f Rome as a typically agricultural society. We think 
of the Romans when they entered history as being, and as for some 
time having been, peasants. Indeed they seem to represent in their way of 
life — and in their law — the agricultural society par excellence. All the 
same, traces o f their earlier stage as cattle breeders may be detected. 
Especially when dealing with the question o f property in very early 
times, we cannot ignore the rem nants of an animal breeder’s society. 
Examples supporting this statement are found in etymology and in law: 
for instance, the later use o f cattle (pecunia) for money, or the close 
relationship between fam ilia  and pecunia, both used for property; also, 
and especially, the exclusion of land from early private property.
Effect of this Development on Property Law
This brings us to a typical Roman notion which dates from 
archaic times. It is the subdivision of things into res mancipi and res 
nec mancipi. The form er were the necessities for the operation o f a farm: 
labour and land. Children, slaves, draft animals, Roman land and servi­
tudes thereon could be transferred only through the formal act of
‘•See Maine’s chapter V III, ’T h e  Early History of Property,” in Anam i Law (London: Everyman’s 
Library, 1972).
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mancipatio.17 Res nec mancipi were all other things. It seems res mancipi 
led to real rights (“rights in rem"). This at least is the opinion of some 
of the most authoritative Romanists.18 According to them familia 
and pecunia were both res mancipi, that is, property essential for the 
operation of the farm, namely, labour. They were familia, i.e. members 
of the household including slaves,19 and pecunia meaning cattle (or all 
domestic animals?). The formal act of mancipatio would suggest that land 
originally was not part of res mancipi as the physical presence of the 
item to be transferred was required. Therefore it seems that land was 
added to res mancipi only later.20
Mancipium was the power over res mancipi. It contained a combina­
tion of patrimonial power over family members and economic power 
over things. This may derive from the fact that at first both were 
factual personal powers a man held over things. In both cases it was 
the actual power, the ability to control, rather than a question o f legal 
title. This strange combination o f personal power over family and 
economic power over things accounts for the construction of mancipatio 
and another ancient formal act o f property transfer, in iure cessio,21 
both legal acts which lead to the acquisition of authority over persons 
as well as things.
By the time the Twelve Tables were written down, probably in 
450 B.C., the terms familia and pecunia were used interchangeably 
and indiscriminately for property and by then land had also been 
included in res mancipi. The Twelve Tables reflect still undeveloped 
legal thinking and they do not deal with an abstract concept of property, 
but wherever they refer to the patrimony as a whole they employ the 
terms familia and pecunia interchangeably.22
•’Both parties would appear in front o f the magistrate with the thing to be sold (a handful of 
earth if it was land). They were accompanied by five witnesses and a “holder of scales”, whose 
scales were struck at one point during the ritual by the purchaser with a piece of copper signifying 
the payment o f cash. (The formality of the act and the num ber o f witnesses were no doubt deemed 
necessary in the absence o f written documents.)
"Especially Mommsen and following him Kaser. Diosdi, Ownership in Ancient and Preclassical Roman 
Law, (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiado, 1970), at 56
‘*See the etymological connotation with famulus = slave.
,0Here is an example of a public law principle being realised through a civil law prescription. 
Res mancipi could only be transferred by mancipatw, which was a legal act of ms civile applicable 
only to Roman citizens. Therefore, it was impossible for foreigners to purchase any of these 
essential means of production. See R. Sohn, lnstitutionen (Leipzig: Dunckert Humbolt, 1911), at 376.
"Res mancipi as well as res nec mancipi could be the object o f tn ture cessio, which took the form 
of a fictional action, an action in which the plaintiff, who was the transferee, claimed the thing 
which was to be transferred to him. The fictitious defendant, actually the transferor, did not deny 
the plaintiff s claim and the judge adjudicated the thing to the plaintiff.
“ Other Roman scholars have maintained various other definitions and distinctions, especially one 
that sees familia used for res mancipi, i.e. family property, and pecunia for res nec mancipi, Le. 
the separate personal property o f the pater famtlias. See O. Karlowa, Romische Rechtsgeschichte II, 
(Leipzig: Veit & Co., 1901), at 73; P. Boniante, Forme primitive ed evoluzione delta proprietà romana, 
(Scritti giuridici varii II, Unione tipografico editrice torinese, Torinto, 1926), at 213; J. E. Kuntze, 
Cursus des ròmischen Rechts, (Leipzig: Hinrichs’ Verlag, 1879), at 48; Supra, footnote 20, at 377.
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From Communal Ownership to Private Ownership
Some indications let us form a picture as to when and how the 
Romans shifted from communal ownership o f land to private owner­
ship. It was a gradual process which began when agriculture became 
more developed and had replaced animal breeding as the main source 
of wealth.
At that time the essential social unit in which the ancient Romans 
wandered and settled was the gens (tribe), a large group of families 
believed to have had a common ancestor. Early social relationships 
were all set within the context o f the gens and they were guided by 
mores, i.e. habits or morals, rather than by laws. The gentes (tribes) 
acquired certain areas of land by acquisition and began to settle there. 
The land was communal property for the collective tribe; this was a fact 
rather than a legally defined situation. It was the result of subjecting 
and expelling others. In the absence of legal rights and remedies 
the members of each genus would defend their common territory23 
against outsiders.
Within this common territory, however, certain plots of land 
were allocated to individual families. After the father’s death these 
plots would revert to the tribe, to be issued once more to a member, 
although quite regularly land would be reissued to the son and hence 
remain with the same family for generations. Yet the family only 
had possessory rights to the land it farmed. The working of the 
land over a period of time established usus, the use. This may be seen 
as the beginning of a nexus between the user and the land, from which 
derived the first form of possession civilis,24 a legal title instead of mere 
factual use.
Conceptually no distinction was made between possession and owner­
ship.25 As preclassical and classical Roman law, however, distinguishes 
clearly and sharply between possession and ownership, we may con­
clude that the notion of ownership gradually took over from that of 
possession, as a consequence of the increasing bond a family may have 
felt towards land it had worked for generation after generation.
A first incremental step made in the gradual process from com­
munal ownership to absolute property rights came with the heredium, 
a garden plot surrounding the farm house. That step was made in 
archaic times and we have no historical information, but legend tells
MSee Morr.msen, Römisches Staatsrecht III (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1888), at 15.
t,Possessio may be traced etymologically lo sedere = to sit, see also German: Besitz.
“ See Kaser, Eigentum und Besitz m  ältrm römischen Recht (Köln: Böhlau, 1956), at 6.
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us about it. It is the quasi-historical story of King Romulus26 who 
gave to every citizen two iugera (acres) of land as his own to be passed 
on by inheritance (hence the term: heredium), but not to be sold 
outside the family.27 With this restriction it is still a long way from 
the later absolute right of ownership. What has puzzled readers at times 
is the amount o f land, which was too small to feed a family even under 
the best circumstances. It is now generally understood that it was not 
meant to maintain the family, but was designated for garden farming — 
as the later use of the word (heredium = garden) indicates. It was 
usually the land adjoining the house and was used to raise vegetables 
for the immediate consumption of the family. It was worked in addition 
to the family’s share in the common agricultural land. Another innovation 
is the m anner of acquisition: the heredium was said to have been obtained 
from the “king”, indicating that it was the central power which bestowed 
legal title where before it was actual use and the animus possedendi 
(the will to keep) which created possession.
The heredium is a transitional form which is found on the Roman 
road to private property. The same transitional form is found again 
on the road back to communal property as taken by communistic 
states. There a small piece of garden land around the house, the 
litchnij utshastok, is the peasants’ last piece of property to remain unex­
propriated.
Absolute Ownership in Rome
When thinking of the Roman law of property we most often accept 
the achievements of the classical period, that is, the first two centuries 
after Christ and we ignore the long period of growth of Roman law as 
well as the equally long period of ossification and decline. When 
Justinan had the civil law codified around 530 A.D. he went back past 
several centuries of decline and vulgarisation o f the law by using the 
jurisconsults of the early third century and the second century Gaius.
Justinian’s Corpus Juris Civilis thus displays the classical Roman con­
cept of property as an absolute right and it was through his Corpus 
Juris that this way of seeing ownership has become known in Europe 
and accepted as “Roman”.
’•Mentioned among others by Plinius, N.H. 18, 2, 7 Bina tunc iugera populo Romano satis erant, 
nulloque maiorem modum adtnbutl Varro, De Re Rustica 1, 10, 2, Bma iugera, quod a Romulo prtmum 
dtvisa innttm quae heredem sequerentur, heredium appeUarunl.
,TWeber, Gesammelte Aufsaetu sur Soiial und Wtrtschaftsgeschichte (Tubingen: Mohr, 1924), at 198.
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In writings o f the classical Roman period we find the clear and 
full description o f the essence of property as an absolute right in private 
law, a right in rem, in a thing.28 It represents a title as untrammelled 
as possible with a minimum of public and private law restrictions. 
There were certain basic requirements o f neighbourliness, and basic 
public specifications as to maintaining agricultural land in good condition, 
or looking after adjoining roads. But the right of ownership was 
otherwise unlimited in time and scope. It was valid against all comers, 
permitted full authority over the thing; to use, sell, will and even to 
destroy it. It was a right which could, in certain ways, become restricted 
by the owner’s act, but initially it was unrestricted29 and remained as 
the residuary interest after the owner had given certain partial rights away.
In the classical period, absolute ownership was fully distinguished 
conceptually not only from the right of possession but also from rights 
on another’s property (iura in re aliena). These partial rights included: 
servitude (easement), usus fructus (use of the fruits), fiducia  and pignus 
(two forms of a pledge30).
Ownership was transferred either through the ancient formal acts 
of mancipatio and in iure cessio, both highly stylised acts dating back to 
very early times when contracts were made verbally in front o f an array 
of witnesses, or through the later simple traditio (transfer) combined with a 
iusta causa traditionis (consideration): Protection o f ownership was enforced 
through the important vindicatio rei, the classical action for recovery of 
property.
Property was a right to a thing excluding any other rights except 
those given by the owner. Even the extent to which the owner could 
create self-imposed restrictions upon his property was limited. While 
he could freely divest himself of nis total property right he was limited 
in chiselling away at that right. The iura in re aliena are such voluntarily 
given rights on one’s property. O f these, servitudes — which have no 
time limit — were limited as to content, and could only be an obligation 
“to suffer” but not to “do”. Usufruct, on the other hand, which is 
legally unlimited as to content, was limited in time, not transferable to 
other persons and extinguished with the usufructuary’s death.
This was the situation in the classical period during the time of the 
principate.31 It was the culmination of a long development, which,
’•This differs from a right m personam which is a right against a certain person who has an 
obligation while a right in rem is valid against everybody with respect to a specific thing.
“ Kaser, Römisches Pnvatrecht (München: C. H. Beck, 1968), at 86.
‘•See tnfra at 172.
*‘The period from Augustus (27 B.C.) to Diocletian (284 A.D.).
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incidentally, was unique. No other primitive society, and tor that matter 
no advanced society in ancient times, it seems, had developed such 
refined legal concepts based on rational thought, separated from religio- 
magic norms.32. It was only the Romans of the Bronze Age who had 
separated fa s  from ins, nefas from iniuria33 and formed a concept of law 
as it applied between men, in the Austinian sense.
Evolution o f Roman Absolute O w nership
This long development of legal thinking found its parallel in the 
political constitution. The tribal predominance in public matters was 
almost imperceptibly replaced by the ordered political society — the 
populus Romanus. In private matters the tribe’s importance was taken 
over by the family when the farmland had become, for the family, an 
object o f ownership rather than possession. The former authority of the 
gens asserted itself, however, in certain aspects o f Roman life until quite 
Tate. For instance, the form er social pressure as to morals and responsi­
bility, especially of the otherwise unrestrained power of the pater familias, 
after c. 443 B.C. was exerted by the censors. Remnants from the pre­
dominance of the gens are also found in the Twelve Tables: a right of 
the gens to inherit from its member if there are no agnate heirs,34 
and the right and duty of the gens to supply a tutor or a curator where 
needed.
Before the writing of the Twelve Tables, most agricultural land 
had already become land o f the family rather than of the gens. The 
transition, a gradual process, was never completed as even in classical 
times some common land remained in existence. As Kaser describes it35 
originally all land was ager publicus; however, piece by piece large 
segments were made into ager privatus.
Family Property — The Pater Familias
When the Roman families extricated themselves from the tutelage 
of the gentes and obtained increasingly more independence their possession 
of part of the communal land became perm anent lawful possession — 
ownership, under the administration of the pater familias. As in other 
Indo-germanic societies the members of the family were co-owners of the 
family property. The pater familias held the property while the members’
S*F. Schulz, Principles of Roman Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), at 20.
ssfas = god-given laws, iui = man-made laws, nefas and miurta = their respective violations.
,4Heirs o f direct relationship through males only.
slSupra, footnote 25 at 238.
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ownership was a latent one. In case of death of the pater familias 
tnis latent ownership o f the domestici, who were sui heredes,36 took over 
automatically without the formal acceptance which was required from 
others. Indeed in early times it was impossible for sui heredes to 
renounce their inheritance. The heirs also remained co-owners of the 
whole family property which they could probably dissolve by mutual 
agreement. But it seems only the Twelve Tables introduced an action 
for the brothers to divide the family property and obtain their share (the 
actio familiae ercisundae).37
The strengthening of the father’s grip on family holdings is a 
development atypical o f other Indo-germanic societies. Gradually the 
pater familias became able to dispose o f the family property by means 
of a testament. The Twelve Tables contain a clause to that effect: 
Uti legassit pater familias super pecunia tutelave suae rei ita ius esto. 
(It shall be legal whatever the pater familias wills for his property and 
family.) This disposition of property even beyond his death indicates that 
family property had become the private property o f the pater familias. 
Another indication of the pater familias strong hold upon the family 
property is the fact that a son who was emancipated (released from 
the father’s power) gained his personal freedom but did not receive a 
proportionate amount o f the family property as he normally would 
after his father’s death. Movables and immovables were thus considered 
the father’s private property, which tended to weaken the earlier sense 
of family co-ownership. But, on the other hand, the claims of family 
membership were still strong enough to make it necessary for the pater 
familias in his will to disinherit explicitly all children whom he did not 
want to take part in the inheritance. Implicit disinheritance (by naming 
someone else heir) did not suffice. In fact, the testament was invalid 
if every child living at the time of the testator’s death was not excluded 
by name from the inheritance.38
By the time of the Twelve Tables the pater familias had become 
the owner o f the family property. This transformation from family 
property to personal property o f the pater familias was a factual change. 
The notion of family property seems to have remained in people’s 
consciousness for some time.
3#That is, all members o f the household who upon the death of the patrrfamilias will be tut tuiis, i f .  gain their 
freedom.
37Diosdi (Supra, footnote 14 at 46) thinks this is the point where family property ceases to exist; it has become 
private property o f the pattr familias.
3*Later again the qurrrla inofficiosi tfstammtt restricted the right of the patrr familias to dispose o f the 
family fortune through testament without considering certain members of the family who were 
entitled to the Irgitima portio.
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Terminology
It is not easy to discuss the ancient Roman concept of ownership 
in the absence o f precise terms. In those early times the words dominium 
and proprietas were not yet in use, nor had the corresponding institution 
been invented. While the term and institution of dominium corres­
ponds to the m odern use, we find, in those earlier periods, only terms 
that suggest their derivative origin; derivative from the more primitive 
notion o f possession. Habere means simply to have, without reference 
to rights; licere implies a right to hold, but does not necessarily mean 
a legal right; meum esse indicates the fact of having, but again does not 
satisfy the question about a legally derived property right. This 
suggests that the Romans of those early times either had an unclear 
notion of ownership or one drastically different from our own. We may 
assume the latter.
The Roman institution o f ownership at the time of the Twelve 
Tables cannot be compared with the classical Roman or the modern 
institution because there is no common denominator. Ownership and 
family relationship were not yet separated. T h e  pater familias had personal 
power (mancipium) over the free members of his household, he had the 
right over life and death, including the property rights to everything any 
of them might earn or inherit. He also had proprietary power (mancipium) 
over res mancipi, which were: slaves, cattle, Roman land and servitudes 
thereon. This complex of economic and paternalistic power grew out 
of the farm background of the early Romans. It ensured the most 
effective operation of the farm if it was governed authoritatively by a 
single responsible person,39 who had full powers to direct all the means 
of production: human labour, animal labour, land and implements. 
This right of direction translates itself into the closest approximation of 
modern property right. But it is only an approximation. If we use its 
corresponding term, mancipium, it becomes clear why this is so. It covers, 
on one hand, a larger area by including paternalistic powers over free 
human beings, and it covers, on the other hand, a smaller area by not 
including res nec mancipi. One must say, therefore, that mancipium 
cannot be equated with ownership because it does not take care o f small 
farm animals, household goods, farm implements and clothing, which all 
are res nec mancipi. Hence, we must not search in ancient Roman law 
for the exact parallel to classical or m odern civilist concepts. But the 
study o f ancient concepts and institutions will be of profit in revealing 
the evolutionary process from archaic law to the final product of 
classical law.
When questioning fundamental rights to property (in Locke’s sense) 
we must distinguish — as Marx did — between property destined
**In m odern farming societies one may still notice a patriarchal tendency. See the example of the 
Serbian Zadruga, as mentioned by Max Weber in Economy and Society, at 69.
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for use or consumption and property as means of production. The 
Romans of certain periods accorded different treatm ent to those two 
categories. Res mancipi were singled out for special treatment. They 
were the means of production to the early farming society, and they 
were held by the family, later by the pater familias. Household chattels, 
clothing and furniture seem to have “belonged” since time immemorial 
to the individual, but, on the other hand, so have weapons, the “means 
of production” of the very early period.
Ownership as a Relative Right
An intermediate state in the evolution of absolute ownership 
might have been the treatm ent of property as a relative right. Opinions 
are divided whether the Romans ever saw property as a relative 
right.40 Most likely they did.41 It becomes apparent from the very 
ancient vindication action, the legis actio sacramento in rem, that there 
was still no full distinction between ownership and possession, that owner­
ship seemed to be rather “the better right to possess” in comparison 
with somebody else who had a lesser right.42
T he procedure o f the legis actio sacramento in rem reveals even 
earlier usages in dealing with the loss of one’s chattels. In those pre- 
historical times, the proprietary remedy was linked with the pursuit 
of theft. The offended party would pursue his lost chattel with the help 
of his family or clan. He might search the house of the suspected 
thief, a habit which became institutionalised in the quaestio lance et licio — 
the search with dish and belt. When the lost article was found in somebody 
else’s possession there was a fight for it in prelegal times, a fight in 
which the deities will have figured in one way or another. After society 
formed a strong enough central legal power, it looked after search 
and restitution of lost chattels. Even then there are surviving traces 
of self-help, as well as o f the suspicion of theft.
The archaic legis actio sacramento in rem reveals some o f these 
ancient rudiments and — for the present discussion — is a prime 
example of an action that limits itself to establishing the relatively 
better right to a thing. The action began when the praetor received 
a statement from each party claiming that the thing was his, meum esse
4*R. v. Ihering, Geist des römischen Rechts 111 (Basel: B. Schwabe. 1954), at 92; E. Levy, West 
Roman Vulgar Law. The Law of Property (Weimar: H. Böhlau Nachfolger, 1956), at 235. Kaser, supra,
footnote 25 at 8), and others are convinced that they did, a view which is intensely attacked by 
Diosdi, (supra, footnote 18 at 105), De Vissher, (“Auctontas et manctpium," SDHI, 22 (1936), at 263) 
and several Italian authors.
4,See Kaser’s most convincing expositions in his Eigentum und Besitz, ibid, and Roman Private Law. 
(Durban: Butterworth’s, 1965), at 93.
41Ibid., at 93.
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aio. Subsequently, the defendant’s claim only was questioned and 
needed proof. This was based upon the suspicion that the thing had 
been stolen. How else would it get into another’s possession? Simple 
societies and primitive legal thinking did not admit of other possibilities 
like holding in good faith.43 Therefore, the defendant had: 1( to 
prove that the disputed item was his; or, 2) to clear himself of the 
charge o f theft if he was not successful in doing the first. The plaintiff 
did not have to prove his claim. At this ¡ oint the frequently stressed 
symmetry o f the procedure ends. The problem to be solved in the 
subsequent lawsuit was then the rightfulness o f the defendant’s 
contravindicatio. The plaintiff offered a wager, the defendant accepted; 
both deposited an amount of the value of the disputed item. This 
wager followed closely the form of the earlier prelegal ordeal (Gottesurteil). 
It was in the form of a self-curse: “may God strike me down if this is 
not so.” Instead o f the punishment through self-curse the sum of 
money was offered to the Gods. This was called the sacramentum be­
cause it was forfeited by the losing party to the adjudicating pontiffs 
who used it to buy sacrificial animals. The right of the defendant 
then was the object of the lawsuit, but not only this, it also was the object 
“of evidence, i.e. the burden of proof was borne by him.”44
A similar form of procedure with reversal of the onus of proof 
was also known in early Germanic law, and is quite easily explained 
as primitive justice.45 This burden of the defendant makes auctoritas 
such an important feature of the Roman Civil law. If the defendant 
could not prove rightful possession the disputed thing was adjudicated 
to the plaintiff, with no further questions asked as to whether the 
plaintiff had a good title — it was deemed established that he had a 
relatively better title and the judge declared his sacramentum (wager) 
as iustum (just) and the defendant’s sacramentum as iniustum, forfeited.46 
There was no possibility foreseen that the judge could declare both 
sacramenta injusta. Yet it was possible that neither was owner, that a 
third party was the rightful owner whose rights were thus ignored — a 
possibility which in a community as small as ancient Rome was not 
likely to occur, especially when considering the publicity of law suits. 
It is, however, the principle that interests us here. If both parties had 
at one time obtained possession o f the thing by theft, neither would 
have absolute property in it. Yet the judge in the legis actio sacramento in 
rem was obliged to decide in favour o f one o f the parties irrespective
43See Schulz, supra, footnote 33 at 248: “Acquisition in good faith was in principle unknown to
Roman law; (with exceptions)".
<4Diosdi, supra, footnote 18 at 102
4*See tnfra at 171.
"Supra, footnote 25, at 7.
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of lawful or unlawful acquisition. The criterion by which he chose was 
then not one of difference in essence: lawful or unlawful, but in degree: 
the relatively better, closer, more proximate right.
Closely connected with the original legis actio sacramento in rem 
is another feature which points in the direction of relative property 
rights. Mancipatio did not only or even mainly transfer legal power 
over the goods sold, but it gave auctoritas; the seller guaranteed proper 
legal title. He promised for himself and his heirs not to claim any rights 
to the thing sold and in case o f a vindiction suit to stand by the emptor 
helping him prove his title. According to Roman law principles this title 
could of course only be as good as the seller’s title and it may have 
been necessary for the prior owner to refer back to the seller from whom 
he obtained the thing, and further on along the line, which in the 
simple earlv Roman economy may not have been difficult. This warranty, 
though only tacitly implied as part o f every transfer through mancipatio, 
was a duty o f the seller and could be legally enforced. Kaser47 cites 
Rabel saying that this feature “points backwards into an area when real 
and obligatory rights were one” and the result is “a limited property 
concept, effective only between the two parties” which, he concludes, 
is nothing but relative property. It stands between possession and the 
classical absolute property.
Another intermediary phase is represented by the treatm ent of 
land in conquered provinces. When private property in its absolute 
form had evolved in the pre-classical period it could only be had on 
Roman (later Italian) land, on fundus italicus. There was no private 
property in this narrow sense o f fundus provincialis which, after conquest, 
became communal property o f the Roman people, like ager publicus, 
the original common land of Rome. This is the theoretical construction.
In practical life the difference appeared only in the tax situation: 
the “owner” o f provincial land had to pay land tax to the populus 
Romanus, the real owner.48 But he could alienate his land at will and 
pass it on to his heirs. The owner o f Roman land did not pay taxes 
(until very much later) and in this sense had fuller ownership than we 
have now. (Public funds were not required in the early period when 
the members o f the civitas would in a co-operative effort maintain roads 
and defense buildings.) Title on provincial land was termed uti fru i 
habere possidere which indicates the private law situation o f rightful 
possession of a portion of the ager publicus; it is less than ownership 
but more than possession.
41Ibid., at 69.
S u p ra , footnote 41 at 95.
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Iura in Re Aliena
Dealing with various problems in connection with property brought 
the Romans to a high level of legal sophistication as they learned 
to distinguish between ownership and possession, between legal and 
physical control. Another such fruitful difficulty was the question o f the 
iura in re aliena: servitudes, usus fructus, fiducia, pignus.49
In early thinking servitudes and usus fructus were seen as small 
segments of ownership cut out from the full title over a thing; 
some scholars50 call this functionally divided ownership.51 They believe 
the recognition o f servitudes and usus fructus as independent real 
rights occurred simultaneously with the assertion of the property right 
as an absolute one — during preclassical times.52
Fiducia and pignus, the two forms of pledge, were developed near 
preclassical times and therefore seem outside the era of relative property 
rights. R oth fiducia and pignus were sureties for debts; fiducia was the 
transfer of a res mancipi to the creditor through mancipatio o r in iure 
cessio with the proviso — pactum fiduciae — to remancipate the res 
mancipi as soon as the debt was paid. Pignus, whether handed over to 
the creditor or retained by the debtor, remained within the debtor’s 
ownership with the proviso that it was to be forfeited automatically 
to the creditor if the debt should be unpaid when due. In both forms 
of surety one finds an infringement upon property rights, voluntarily 
given — for cause — by the owner. The restriction was limited in time 
but during its duration another title was constituted upon the property 
right, another layer of legal right, namely, the proviso mentioned. 
Kaser sees this also as functionally divided ownership.
The essential changes in the notion of ownership took place during 
the preclassical period which corresponds to the late Republic. In that 
little-documented era, the classical concept of ownership as an absolute 
right was born. Mancipium turned into dominium or proprietas, both 
identical, and, unlike mancipium, comparable concepts to m odern civilist 
and North American “private property”.
“ Mentioned supra, at 165. 
l0Supra, footnote 25 at 17, 302.
“ Diosdi (Supra, footnote 18 at 107) does not agree, He sees servitudes and tuw  fructus 
originally as non-corporeal independent rights. One may ask how this is to be reconciled with the 
inclusion of servitudes among the original res manctpi which are physically obtainable through 
mancipatio, ie. gripping with the hand?
“ Because o f their similar nature, both servitude and usus fractus were listed by Justinian as
servitudes; urns fractus was styled as a personal servitude.
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The idea of property as a relative right had disappeared when 
the legis actio sacramento in rem was replaced by the more modern 
vindicatio rei; in it there was no longer the symmetry o f both parties 
claiming title to a thing; it was the plaintiff alone who did so. The 
burden of proof was removed from the defendant and shifted to the 
plaintiff who had to prove his title first. In this way an absolute right 
of ownership was recognized.
A form of relative property right continued to exist in the peregrini 
law. It was a new remedy developed by the praetor to take care of 
less clear cases, when property had been acquired without the required 
form, as simple traditio in the case o f res mancipi, or when it had been 
acquired in good faith from a non-owner and the required period of pre­
scription had not run out. The actio Publiciana protected property 
received through an incomplete transaction against everybody but the 
true owner, thus protecting the relatively better title.
The actio Publiciana was, however, only one of the practical 
solutions to which the Romans often resorted; it does not detract 
from the notion o f absolute property now clearly developed. This 
notion — the ultimate result of a long development — was not to 
remain in use for very long; but, as a concept, it set a param eter for 
all further, thought about the problem of private ownership.
Conclusion
In short, then, the Roman development almost follows a full circle 
from primitive notions which did not distinguish between possession 
and ownership, to partial ownership in the heredium and relative owner­
ship as an obligatory right rather than an absolute right, to the culmination 
in an absolute concept as it was honed by the jurisconsults in the 
second century A.D. Then came simplification and confusion to this 
highly sophisticated concept which was briefly interrupted by the 
efforts o f Justinian’s commission. The gradual decay lasted until the 
11th century when the Glossators began a reversal which ultimately, 
in the 19th century, reinstated the highly refined classical concept of 
absolute ownership. Throughout these centuries counter-movements 
challenged individual property as a total right. These counter-move­
ments were generated by various religious groups like the Anabaptists 
and the Diggers, by the feudal system as such, by 19th century Anarchists 
and by Marxist theories.
However, the idea of property as a total right, for a few decades 
in the 19th century, seemed the last and final word. But, to many, 
these sacred property rights have now become a social evil. As we find 
ourselves more and more retreating from absolute property rights we
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may find solace in the recognition that the concept of ownership 
has never been a stable one. It seems the problem o f ownership does 
not permit a final solution. For one, “all is in flux” — variable com­
ponents change, new variables emerge and it is extremely difficult to 
find and to hold the ‘right’ balance between change and stability. 
Moreover, it is difficult to find a perm anent compromise between public 
and private interests, and a perm anent allocation o f values based on 
either justice or efficiency, or possibly on newly arising principles.
At the present time, the question arises whether the increase in 
numbers of people on the earth and generally higher expectations 
may not render the concept of private property an anachronism. 
Certain parallels with primitive times are taking shape today. In a 
primitive age, not much land had been cleared, agricultural techniques 
were undeveloped, resources were hardly above the subsistence level, 
often below it, in spite of a thin population. Today the enormous 
increase in population and individual demands offset intensive cultivation 
of land, m odern technology and efficient use of resources.
This brief view of the Roman property concept may help us see 
our present and future legal institutions concerning property as the 
response to social utility and it may prepare us to accept changes as 
they become necessary. The case of the trespassing snowmobiler may 
be one of such changes.
